by Irina Tsukerman
- A version of this article first appeared in German on Mena-Watch.com, by Hossam Sadek.
- Note: Jason G.’s role in Qatar was undercover, and according to the Berliner Zeitung, the WMP engagement and negotiations with the Ambassador Al Khulaifi was a sting operation.
The former secret service (intelligence operative) employee, whose role as working as an elite Western intelligence operative has been documented by Zeit and Berliner Zeitung, who now works as a private security service provider with the anonymous name “Jason G.”, said in an interview with Mena-Watch on Friday: “My dossier describes the Qatari financing of Hezbollah, the Muslim Brotherhood and the past and future planned Iranian and Houthi drone attacks against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ”. According to him, “Jason G.” previously worked for a Western secret service for 16 years and between 2016 and 2017 worked as an undercover agent in Qatar. During this time he concentrated on the illegal arms trade and the financing of terrorist organizations.
The story set out in the dossier begins at the time when Jason G. his missions, along with numerous other destinations, also took him to Doha. There he came across some explosive information – for example an arms delivery from Serbia, which was carried out by a company in Qatar for Hezbollah in 2017. According to his dossier, “General Dhalan Al Hamad has; a member of the royal family in Qatar, used gold from Uganda to fund this arms trade ”. “Jason G.” goes on to say that “the large Qatari bank ‘QNB’ has also participated in the effort to raise money for this deal”.
His dossier shows that a Qatari company made the deal with Serbia and transferred the weapons to North Macedonia, where the Qataris succeeded in disguising the weapons as building materials with the help of local steel companies. Corrupt officials at the North Macedonian Customs have helped to forge the shipping documents accordingly in order to cover up the origin of the freight, which is now declared as building material. Then the weapons were taken to the port of Thessaloniki in Greece and from there to Lebanon.
According to the dossier, there were also cash flows from Doha to Hezbollah, the Lebanese terrorist organization that has been banned in Germany since April . “With the knowledge of influential government officials, the donations were generated by charities in Doha,” writes “Jason G.” and specifies: “Above all, the Qatari charities Sheikh Eid and the Education Foundation passed 500 million dollars on to Hezbollah in 2020 alone . “
According to the dossier, however, Qatar’s actions were not limited to supporting terrorist attacks and funding extremist organizations. The Qataris also had a “senior advisor” in the Saudi government to influence Saudi policy and to give both Hezbollah and the Houthis a military advantage in Yemen.
The dossier culminates in explanations of how the Qatarians tried to buy “Jason Gs.” Silence . Qatari officials, including Abdulrahman bin Mohammed Sulaiman al-Khulaifi, Qatar’s ambassador to Belgium and NATO, have offered him the sum of 750,000 euros if he – instead of making his information public – keep silent about the role of the Qatari regime in the delivery of money and arms to Hezbollah.
Previously, “Jason G”. revealed the role of a major German lobby group in facilitating these transactions and giving them a cover of legitimacy. “Jason G” was introduced to the consulting company, WMP, headed by a political advisers, Michael Inacker, through a lawyer with connections in German politics in 2017. Inacker has had a rich experience in working for various media and corporations prior to crossing over to political consulting.
As the original Zeit article explains, Inacker was a true believer in the power of communications – as an offensive weapon, as much as a tool of peaceful exchanges. “Communication is the condition of all battles”, emblazoned as a quote from the founder Hans-Hermann Tiedje, ex- BildBoss, on the WMP website: “If you convince, you win!” Inacker helped “Jason G.” establish contact with the German intelligence, which, along with lawyers, went through a lengthy and thorough process of corroborating the dossier.
WMP, according to Zeit, had previously worked with Qatar and Inacker had the right contacts to match “Jason G”‘s interests. He made an introduction to a Qatari diplomat, and, in the first months of 2019, the three got together to discuss a possible arrangement for the dossier. Thanks to Inacker’s involvement, the article goes on to say, “Jason G” met with the diplomat at least half a dozen times. The diplomat, later revealed to be the Qatari envoy to Brussels made mention that “Jews were their enemies” (referring to Qatar), and paid “Jason G” for the information in the dossier, 10,000 Euros in cash each time, and in later months provided additional 100, 000 euros. However, there was no written record of that transaction.
The envoy claimed that the information would be used to clean out corruption. Around July 2019, “Jason G”, according to Zeist, accepted an offer to work as a consultant for an additional 10,000 euros per month for a year-long-contract. The parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding, which Zeist had reviewed. Qatar had agreed not to press charges for espionage nor to reveal Jason G’s information to other countries. Zeist revealed that Jason G. had shared information such as the name of donors and supporters, including an “influential diplomat” with his Qatari interlocutors.
The following month, “Jason G.’s” firm entered into a formal agreement with WMP, says Zeist, which had likewise gained access to the document formalizing the relationship. “Jason G”‘s company would be working on developing business relationships in Qatar, with WMP playing the role of relationship broker and facilitator. For all agreements that led to a “deal”, WMP would receive a 20% commission. According to Zeist, Jason G. would meet with Inacker on a regular basis, sharing the proceeds he received from the Qataris in cash, delivered in envelopes. At one point, Jason G. received 15,000 euros from a Qatari military member, according to a transfer receipt reviewed by Zeist.
In his comments to Zeist, Inacker had denied anything untoward or inappropriate about that arrangement, describing it as a normal business commission for the facilitation of business contacts, but did not admit that “Jason G.” had ever played the role of an informant. He also claimed not to have made any agreements with “Jason G’s” firm to that effect, but a few weeks after the conclusion of the first agreement, continues Zeist, “Jason G’s” firm entered into a second agreement with WMP, also reviewed by Zeist. WMP had expressed interest in obtaining clients among the network of the firm to which “Jason G.” belonged. WMP had eventually admitted to the second agreement but claimed it replaced the first.
“Jason G” refused to signed confidentiality agreement pushed by WMP, hired a new Berlin lawyer, and offered his services to the Israeli embassy. Berliner Zeitung, in its reporting on this story, acknowledged that this series of events involving Inacker and WMPwere part of a sting operation, to draw out a corrupt lobbyist and to furter advance the understanding of Qatar’s role in covering up their funding of terrorists and extremists. In early May, he once again met with Inacker, and in the conversation discussed Qatar’s offer of compensation of 750,000 euros and assurances to the lawyer concerning the allegations of Qatar’s funding of Hezbullah. WMO reportedly stood to benefit from such an arragement, but Inacker denied any knowledge of the alleged discussions between Qatar and “Jason G”.
WMP has an interesting past. It had worked with various state clients in the past, including Saudi Arabia, but after Jamal Khashoggi’s death, ended its cooperation with the Kingdom. Inacker claimed that the optics with the German public were bad for business. He also implied that WMP was a “moral company” in breaking relations with KSA, but the above-described arrangement calls that into question. Furthermore, while claiming “indecisiveness” as justification for his role in these interactions, Inacker also stated to Zeist that he did not use the “confidentiality agreement” to keep information about Qatar’s alleged financing of terrorism, including Hezbullah, from the German authorities and public knowledge.
According to “Jason G”‘s statement to Zeit, Inacker made the following comment indicating his level of awareness of the implication of certain information for Qatar’s image: If he ” an enemy of Qatar “, then he would not bring stories about working conditions on the construction sites of the soccer World Cup,” but I would bring this story. A story with “evidence that Qatar funds an organization” like Hezbollah. That would then be “on the first page of the Bild newspaper, then Qatar would have a problem”. Although Inacker disputed the context, he did not deny making that comment.
WMP reportedly disbanded following these revelations, but the role Western lobbies play in facilitating Qatar’s transactions, whitewashing its image, and perhaps, covering up unsavory activities, such as the financing of international terrorist networks continues. In the United States alone Qatar invests millions into lobbying efforts, consulting firms, and PR, quadrupling its expenditures in 2018.
Note: Saudi Arabia recently replaced senior officers responsible for Coalition in Yemen, allegedly in response to claims of corruption, and mismanagement, and referred the former head of the Coalition, and his son, a governor in Saudi Arabia,to investigators. Some sources believe they are suspected of facilitating contacts with Islamists and ignoring reported contacts between Qatar, local ISlamists, and Houthis.